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Summary 
 
Who: Boeing Corporation, Wichita, and the International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers 
 
Where: Wichita, Kansas 
 
When:   First Visit:  Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Wesley Harris, 
and Rocco Paduano May 23, 2000 
Second Visit:  Betty Barrett and Thomas Kochan July 
26-27, 2000 
 
What: Evolution of a High Performance Work Organization 
Process 
 
 
 Executive Summary 
 
Key challenges and lessons learned 
 
In 1997 Boeing’s Wichita Division and the International Association 
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers agreed to launch a “High 
Performance Work Organization” (HPWO) process.  This followed the 
introduction of a Lean Production Initiative in 1994-95 and an Activity 
Based Costing (ABC) initiative in 1996.  Managers and union leaders 
in Wichita sought to sustain and grow each of 
these change and improvement efforts in 
ways that empower the workforce and 
enhance the competitiveness of the 
operations. Although these initiatives share 
some similar objectives and could potentially 
serve to complement and reinforce each 
other, to date they have been led and managed separately.  Each is 
experiencing a slow and difficult path of diffusion.   The key challenge 
facing management and union leaders is to decide how to best 
integrate these separate improvement programs into a single, focused 
initiative that builds broader awareness, support, and demand for its 
features across all levels of the workforce and the management and 
union organizations in the Wichita operation. Given the combination 
of the engineering culture of Boeing and the pragmatic orientation of 
the workforce in Wichita, the parties may want to shift to a more 
targeted task or problem specific approach that engages a broad cross 
section of hourly workers, engineers, and managers in specific 
improvement initiatives.  Doing so might shift from a top-down 
supplier push to a distributed, demand-pull process of innovation and 
adaptation. 
Managers and 
union leaders in 
Wichita sought to 
…empower the 
workforce… 
 
The most significant external threats to the success of these efforts and 
the stability of the enterprise are the perceived threat of losing 
products and projects to other Boeing facilities or to external suppliers, 
and the corresponding insecurities and fear of downsizing on the part 
of the workforce.  However, these external threats are not as 
significant as internal factors, particularly, the lack of consistent 
leadership support and follow-through within both the company and 
union organizations.  Other sources of instability are the conflicts and 
political pressures that occur in the on-going labor management 
relationships and spillover to slow down or disrupt temporarily the 
ability of the parties to work together on these joint improvement 
efforts.  
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 Mitigation Strategies 
 
The good news is that steps to mitigate these potential threats can be 
identified since they are quite similar to those often encountered and 
overcome by other organizational change efforts.  This is particularly 
true because the HPWO, as well as the lean production and ABC 
efforts are all still in their pilot or early stages of development.  The 
mitigation strategies suggested by other cases would call for: 
 
1. Integration of HPWO, lean production, and ABC change 
efforts; 
2. Shift to a demand-pull project/problem specific 
improvement strategy; 
3. Creation of a stable pool of funds to support proposals for 
improvement projects; 
4. Commitment by both management and union leaders to 
protect their joint improvement processes from being “held 
hostage” to the normal political cycle of union elections, 
collective bargaining negotiations, leadership and staff 
turnover, or other conflicts that occur. 
 
Boeing in Wichita 
 
Boeing’s Wichita Division supports the commercial, military, and 
space products and services of the Boeing Corporation. Operations in 
Wichita date back to the old Stearman Aircraft Company, which 
became part of Boeing in 1934 when the federal government required 
United Airlines, Pratt and Whitney, and Boeing to split into three 
separate companies.  Presently, the Wichita Division employs 
approximately 16,800 employees, down from approximately 20,000 in 
1997.  It is the largest employer in the State of Kansas.  The division 
produces 75 percent of the parts for Boeing’s 737 commercial airliner 
as well nacelles, nose sections and other parts for Boeing’s 747, 757, 
767, and 777 as well as a range of maintenance services and parts for 
the company’s military and commercial products. 
 
Sources of Instability:  Wichita and other Aerospace Facilities 
 
Table 1 summarizes the differences between sources of instability at 
Wichita and the average of four other plants in the aerospace industry.   
The data come from survey data collected from a cross section of 
managers, engineers, and hourly personnel in Wichita.  Their 
responses are compared to the average responses from comparable 
samples of employees in four sister aerospace industry facilities.   We 
break the sources of instability down into two categories.  The top 
panel reports external sources of instability, i.e., those that come from 
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 customers, markets, technologies, or suppliers while the bottom panel 
lists internal sources of instability that come from actions or decisions 
controllable within the company or plant.  The data show that Wichita 
plants surveyed and more internally 
generated instability.  Wichita 
employees report significantly less 
instability from externally generated 
budget shifts or changes in technology 
and no differences in the other external 
categories.  In contrast, Wichita 
employees report greater instability 
coming from internal company and/or 
plant decisions in five of six categories than their counterparts in other 
plants.  The highest-ranking source of instability is perceived changes 
in leadership vision, followed by changes in internal budgets and 
stresses and tensions associated with changes in the plant. 
Wichita employees report 
greater instability coming from 
internal company and/or plant 
decisions…than their 
counterparts in other plants.  
 
Table 1 
Sources of Instability:  Wichita and Other Aerospace Plants 
 
EXTERNAL SOURCES OF 
INSTABILITY 
AVERAGE OF 
OTHER PLANTS 
WICHITA DIFFERENCE 
Budget allocations 0.98 0.27  -0.71 
Product demand 1.23 1.28 +0.05 
Customer requirements 1.28 1.26 +0.02 
Equipment/technology 2.09 1.21  -0.61 
Supplier performance 0.96 0.96   0.00 
 
INTERNAL SOURCES OF 
INSTABILITY 
   
Internal budgets 0.98 1.25 +0.27 
Voluntary turnover 0.95 0.91 - 0.04 
Reengineering 0.96 1.12 +0.16 
Leadership vision 1.01 1.29 +0.28 
Tension/stress around change 1.11 1.19 +0.08 
Subcontract out work .059 0.92 +0.33 
In sourcing of work 0.49 0.58 +0.09 
    
 
 
The HPWO Initiative   
 
Unlike most similar efforts introduced into American companies over 
the past twenty years, the process and elements of the HPWO program 
were built around a model developed by the IAM’s High Performance 
Work Organization Partnerships Department rather than around a 
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 strategy initiated by the company. The decision to embark on this 
program arose out of conversations between Richard Schneider, the 
IAM Vice President responsible for aerospace industry and Jerry 
Calhoun, Boeing Corporation’s Vice President of Labor Relations.  
They wanted to start an initiative somewhere in the company and felt 
that Wichita would be a good option because of the good relationships 
among top management and labor leaders there.  
 
This decision reflected a shift in IAM philosophy and strategy toward 
employee participation.  For many years, the IAM was skeptical and 
suspicious of the motives behind company initiated participatory 
efforts, seeing them as efforts to undermine local unions where they 
were present and avoid unions where a facility was not 
organized.  Given this view, international leaders 
urged locals to not participate in such efforts.  In the 
late 1990s, the IAM strategy shifted.  Top union 
leaders decided to take a proactive approach by 
outlining a model HPWO program with full union 
participation and co-management. The union set up a department to 
promote and support this effort.  Figure 1 summarizes the elements in 
the IAM HPWO model.   
In the late 1990’s, 
the IAM strategy 
shifted. 
 
Two years after the agreement to launch the initiative, the program 
showed significant potential.  A first pilot project had been 
implemented in the strut drill out machine shop—a unit that produces 
titanium engine mounts for the 737 and 777.  But warning signals were 
clearly present.   Union and management leaders all agreed the process 
was moving slowly.  Moreover, the program seemed to be 
experiencing many of the same dilemmas and challenges that prior 
HPWO programs in other companies have experienced.  The question 
posed in this case is whether the parties can learn from the experiences 
of others and use these challenges or pivotal events to reinforce and 
strengthen the effort.  Or will they repeat the same mistakes or 
behavioral patterns that have stalled or destroyed similar programs in 
other companies?   
 
Evolution of the Process.  As noted above, the HPWO program 
was a top-down initiative stimulated by corporate and international 
union leaders’ desire to pilot a new approach to labor management 
relations.  This is consistent with the perception the workforce at 
Wichita has of most change programs.  In response to a question in the 
survey, 59 percent see change at Wichita initiated by corporate 
executives and 27 percent see change as coming from Wichita 
executives.  In contrast, only 8 percent see change as arising 
negotiated changes involving all parties with a stake in the issue and 
even fewer (6 percent) see change as coming from the “bottom-up by 
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 employees.”  The effect of this is to place a high reliance on corporate 
and plant level leaders to continue to lead the process.   
 
Top management and union leaders were active and instrumental in 
launching the HPWO efforts.  They attended a weeklong training 
session with union counterparts at the IAM’s traning facility in Placid 
Harbor, Maryland.  All accounts of that week of learning and 
interaction were very positive.  Out of it came a shared commitment 
and plan for implementing the HPWO program consistent with the 
IAM guidelines shown in Figure 1.   Our interviews with the key 
leaders indicated that they continue to be committed to goals of the 
HPWO initiative.  However, there does not appear to be a shared view 
for how to move the process forward.  
 
Jeff Turner, the Vice President and General Manager of Wichita 
operations, sees the HPWO initiative as a vehicle for improving 
flexibility, costs and  labor management relations.  He recognizes the 
need for union leaders to share ownership of the process and attributes 
the failures of prior efforts to introduce quality improvement programs 
to the lack of union involvement in them.  But he also expresses some 
frustration with the slow pace of change and the inability of the 
company and the union to develop a shared vision regarding the 
challenges facing industry in general and Boeing and the Wichita 
operations in particular.  In his words: 
 
HPWO appears to be the only way I can get the IAM to move 
with us.  The world is moving away from us---our labor 
relations are part of an anachronistic system.  The last 
contract—we just didn’t get it, we were like ships passing in 
the night.  We [management] see the whole issue as being lean 
and efficient and expanding our markets where you really have 
confidence in your ability and partner with others who are good 
at other things.   
 
For our part, we have been naïve on how incredibly important 
it is to recognize the legitimacy of the union and to see their 
shared interest in growing the business—if the union is left out 
of this they feel their legitimacy is being undermined. 
 
Jeff, therefore, sees it as his responsibility to 
diversify and grow the business without building in 
employment swings, and to involve the union in this 
process.  That is why he supports the HPWO 
process.  Time is the major constraint he faces in 
supporting the HPWO effort.  He is responsible for 
moving multiple initiatives forward at Wichita, 
Time is the 
major 
constraint …in 
supporting the 
HPWO effort. 
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 including the lean production and activity based costing efforts.  
 
This vision is quite similar to that of Ron Eldridge, the IAM Directing 
Business Agent and statewide leader.  Ron hopes that the HPWO 
effort will help transform labor management relations from its old, and 
in his view, outdated arms’ length model to one that truly empowers 
employees and involves the union as a partner with management in 
maintaining the work currently done at Wichita and/or bringing in new 
work: 
 
The HPWO process started slow because of mistrust from our 
history.  But by going through HPWO we found new ways to 
look at costing.  We are trying to get the company to truly get 
into cost based accounting.  It’s been healthy for both of us…. 
It’s all about growing the business—more opportunities.   
 
The biggest challenge we face is over the direction of the 
company.  We can’t get caught up in selling off things because 
Wall Street perks up and bumps up the stock.  We have to keep 
this [facility] in tact…That will be our biggest struggle. 
 
We have two full time people doing this.  One full time person 
is looking at contracting out—this came out the last contract 
negotiations.  This causes more people to get their pencils 
sharpened.  In the past work went out the door for no good 
reasons.  Today that’s changed because there are these checks 
and balances.  But that means the onus is on our back to get 
involved and be responsible.  But that’s the future of unions.  If 
we are going to keep manufacturing in this country, we have to 
do it. 
. 
The initial support from senior management and union leaders has not 
yet cascaded down to other plant and local union levels.  The local 
lodge president, Garland Baird, shares a strong commitment to 
empowering the workforce but expressed deep frustration over the 
time constraints that management and union leaders face. 
 
I’ve been involved in HPWO from the start…. Witnessed this 
program change and change and think it could make a 
difference for people and the company.  But I don’t see the 
effort on both sides of the street to make it fly.  If we could get 
some of the higher levels out of the way we could do some 
good.  People are way too busy and the [international] union 
leaders who don’t work here don’t know what’s going on and 
are not available.  Company leaders are also busy and so it’s 
frustrating to get something accomplished. 
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Garland sees great potential in the HPWO process if workers could be 
“turned loose” and truly empowered, and in this sense his vision for 
this process is quite similar to that of top management and union 
leaders: 
 
HPWO could be the tool workers use to do their jobs and to 
make the place more profitable.  For example, if you have a 
process you can’t get changed, HPWO could be used to fix it.  
Just put people in charge of their work.  People don’t want to 
be empowered to the point that managers don’t have a say, but 
HPWO could teach people the right way to work together. If 
successful, it would give people pride in their work.  They 
would be making actual decisions on how to do their work 
without a supervisor standing over them and allow them to 
have knowledge based on how the business works so that they 
would really understand how this place works. 
 
But while he shares this general vision, he sees a contradiction 
between what HPWO stands for and the reality workers experience on 
the shop floor.   The layoffs and downsizing of the facility, in his 
mind, continue a climate of skepticism and distrust of program 
initiatives such as HPWO.  
 
Within management, similar ambivalence exists.  Those engaged in 
other initiatives, such as the lean production efforts and activity based 
cost accounting see their initiatives as running parallel but with only 
tangential interaction with the HPWO efforts.  But like HPWO, these 
efforts are moving forward in a slow, incremental fashion and must 
also compete for scarce managerial time and support.  (See Figures 1 
and 2 for short summaries of the lean production and the activity based 
costing projects). 
 
While the survey data indicate that employees see little joint or bottom 
up stimulus or effort for change, focus group sessions with both 
engineers and hourly employees identified several examples of 
effective off-line problem solving efforts.  One group we observed and 
interviewed, for example, was working on solving a 
problem with rivets that were not properly aligned on a 
particular sub-assembly.  In response to a question of what 
factors made the group successful, the unanimous answer 
was that the problem (rivets not lining up properly) was 
identified as a serious concern by front line shop floor 
workers, and the process followed brought together the 
different technical and functional experts needed to search for root 
causes, evaluate alternative solutions, and create buy in for the solution 
The 
process 
was 
demand-
driven -- 
 7 
 chosen.  This approach fits well with Boeing-Wichita’s engineering 
and pragmatic, quality oriented culture.  The process was demand-
driven—initiated by a problem identified by front line workers that 
supervisors and engineers agreed was both important and solvable.  
The supervisor and engineers with responsibility for the problem were 
given the resources to bring together a team with the mix of 
knowledge needed to generate options for correcting the problem.  
Front line workers were part of the team and their views weighed 
heavily in evaluating alternative solutions, since in the end, they would 
be the ones to both implement and live with them.      
 
The management and union coordinators of the HPWO project, Dana 
Smith and Gary Cochran, have a planned timetable and gradual 
strategy for moving the HPWO program forward.  They seek to 
continue to train more workers and supervisors and to encourage 
additional work units to initiate change efforts.   By May, 2001, they 
hope to have completed the training of all the workers in the pilot strut 
fabrication work unit and then move on from there.  They agree that 
the best approach is one of gradual, incremental expansion, but see the 
major constraint as the competition for top management and union 
leadership time and support.  They express some frustration over the 
number of plant leadership steering committee meetings that have 
been postponed or cancelled due to competing commitments.   
 
In summary, at the suggestion of corporate and international IAM 
leaders, the Wichita HPWO program was launched.  It got off to a 
strong start with the highly acclaimed leadership 
training session at the IAM Placid Harbor, Maryland 
Education Center. A first pilot program was 
implemented and also appears to have been 
successful.  The program continues to evoke positive 
statements of support from top management and 
labor leaders.  But progress has been slow and the 
momentum may be declining.  Neither top management nor union 
leaders have been able to commit the time needed to hold regular 
meetings of the joint steering committee called for in the program 
design.  Union and management turnover in the facilitator positions 
has slowed the process.  Union election politics have further slowed 
the effort.  Competing visions for the role of HPWO, Lean, and 
Activity Based Costing programs as the lead change efforts in Wichita 
further limit progress.  Few rank and file union members or salaried 
personnel have been exposed to the program yet. 
The Wichita 
HPWO program 
…got off to a 
strong start… 
 
Lessons from a Similar Case:  Xerox and UNITE.  If other 
cases are any indication, the slow evolutionary path laid out in the 
conventional HPWO model will not materialize and be difficult to 
 8 
 sustain.  Consider, for example, the lessons from one of the most 
highly acclaimed and long lasting joint union-management 
partnerships in the country:  Xerox and the Union of Needtrades, 
Industrial, and Textile Employees (UNITE).  That effort began in 1980 
at the urging of Xerox’s CEO and proceeded with a similar gradual, 
incremental quality circle effort governed by a joint union-
management structure and supported by a training effort very similar 
to what is in place in Wichita.  But, like the Wichita effort, the 
incremental process slowed down about two years after it got started 
as the parties began to encounter layoffs and other conflicting 
pressures.  What moved it forward and sustained it for twenty years 
was not a smooth gradual planned expansion of quality circles 
anticipated in its original design.  Instead four things happened.  First, 
the parties took advantage of naturally occurring pivotal events to 
reinforce their commitment to the effort, signaling skeptical rank and 
file and managers alike that the process was valued and could be used 
to address the key challenges facing them.  One highly visible example 
was the threat to outsource work.  Instead of following the standard 
contractual process for outsourcing, management and union leaders 
assigned a trained task force of hourly workers, union representatives, 
engineers, and middle managers to study the work at risk, recommend 
changes in work processes and accounting systems, and other 
organizational practices that might make the work competitive.  If the 
estimated savings matched the estimated savings from outsourcing, the 
work would stay in house.  Use of ad hoc problem solving task forces 
like this appealed to both operations managers and rank and file 
workers  because they were focused on critical issues and problems, 
were finite in time, and engaged a vertical cross section of the 
workforce—hourly and salaried workers in a common problem solving 
process.   
 
The second thing that worked at Xerox was the integration of the QC 
and employee involvement process with a top-down total quality 
management process that first focused on the CEO’s top executive 
team and then cascaded down throughout the ranks of the 
organization.  Bringing the resources and strengths of the top down 
and the bottom up processes together reinforced and helped to sustain 
both efforts.   
 
Wichita is well poised to apply the lessons from this experience.  It 
already has in place a number of ad hoc problem solving task forces 
and teams.  We met with several that were functioning well, proud of 
what they were achieving, and enthusiastic about the use of similar 
approaches in the future if or when problems suited to this approach 
surfaced.   
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 Third, the Lean and ABC program initiatives serve as the counterparts 
to Xerox’s total quality effort.  Better integrating these efforts and 
creating one common steering committee with representation from the 
IAM, SPEEA, and management, identified specific projects that have 
high payoff potential. 
 
Finally, Boeing and the IAM have another program that can be 
integrated more fully—its joint training fund and program.  Some links 
to the joint fund already are being pursued—the fund has been used for 
some training on safety.  One of the strengths of this joint program is 
that it has a steady stream of funds based on payroll hours, and 
application for use of the funds comes directly from the workforce or 
units that will benefit from them.  Thus it is more demand driven, 
rather than efforts to supply or convince a group of workers and their 
managers to initiate a HPWO training program or activity.   
 
Summary and Recommendations 
 
The HPWO effort at Wichita got started with strong support, has 
demonstrated its ability to contribute in a specific work area, but has 
been slow to evolve largely because of the multiple demands on top 
management time and lack of a bottom up demand for the program.  In 
addition, HPWO must compete for scarce management and union 
leadership time with the lean manufacturing and activity based costing 
projects, both of which appear to also be moving slowly.  All are at 
risk of atrophying unless actions are taken to build a broader base of 
support for them and to focus them on specific problems.  This shift is 
not only consistent with the pragmatic, engineering culture at Wichita; 
it is also consistent with what has worked for other successful labor 
and management joint change efforts.   
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 Figure 1 
The IAM Principles for High Performance Work Organization 
Partnerships 
A Full Partnership Between the IAM and Management… The 
union and the employer draft a Partnership Agreement, which is 
signed by those individuals with the highest level of responsibility 
within the firm and the union. 
 
Shared Decision-Making…Joint design, joint decision-making, and 
joint implementation of new work systems is at the heart of a 
partnership. 
 
Development of Continuous Learning and Skill Building…. The 
IAM strongly believes that we must engage in life-long learning, both 
on the job and in the classroom, to continuously upgrade and expand 
skills.  
 
Continuous Integration of Leading Edge Technology… As the 
partnership develops, the workers need to be actively involved in all 
aspects of technology integration. 
 
A Co-Determined Definition of Quality… Labor and management 
must jointly define the meaning of quality, the customers’ 
expectations, and develop a strategy to meet or exceed those 
expectations. 
 
Shared Technical and Financial Information…If the partners are 
going to engage in shared decision-making, then they must have the 
information to make good decisions. 
 
Ongoing Joint Determination of the Cost…Traditional cost 
accounting methods lump costs together and give us flawed 
information with which to make critical decisions about our 
workplaces.  We need to have an activity based costing system that 
takes the costs of all of the activities—both direct and indirect—that 
go into producing a product or service. 
 
A Labor Union…Management must accept and understand the union 
as the independent source of power for the workers. 
 
Dedicated Individuals…Both labor and management assume 
leadership roles in the partnership.  This requires dedication to the 
partnership process, without compromising the independence of the 
partners.   
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 A Jointly Developed Strategic Business Plan…The IAM strongly 
believes the partners must jointly develop a plan for the future of the 
business, that examines current products and services, develops new 
products and services, and sets forth the goals and direction the 
partners will take to achieve future growth. 
 
Source:   Field Manual:  High Performance Work Organization 
Partnerships.  International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers, January 1999, pp. 7-1-7-4. 
 12 
 Figure 2 
The Lean Production Initiative*  
 
Wichita’s lean production initiative began in 1994 when Dan Becker, 
Director of Operations asked for options for how to make use of just in 
time and manufacturing resource planning processes in Wichita.  He 
had just come from Boeing Canada where he had implemented both of 
these processes successfully.  A group was formed to benchmark how 
other organizations such as Hewlett Packard, Motorola, and NUMMI 
use these concepts and how they relate to other efforts such as 
employee involvement, activity based costing, among others.   
 
In late 1994 a concept paper was prepared based on these visits but 
higher priorities sidetracked it, particularly the effort to re-engineer the 
facility’s information systems.  In late 1994 we got the go-ahead for a 
pilot project.  We tried to convince our leadership that we had to 
involve the union early to be effective, but we didn’t do this and had 
problems over who should be involved.  Eventually we got around this 
by agreeing we would work within the current work rules in the 
contract.  This limited us but we knew we had to do it this way. 
 
So the pilot was launched in August 1995.  When the HPWO idea 
came along in 1997, we saw this as an enabler—a way to get people 
engaged.  After the joint training on HPWO at Placid Harbor, we set 
up a lean training for the same group.  We customized the training to 
be compatible with HPWO—focused on kaizen workshops.  We 
showed how the tools were compatible—could use kaizen tools, stay 
within work rules, and promote HPWO.   
 
But then there was not more interaction between lean and HPWO.  
The teams never met again.  My hope was that we would have the 
business unit levels point the way.  But these teams never got going.  
I’m not sure why.  Maybe contract negotiations got in the way.   
 
Three years ago I wrote a vision document suggesting that in two years 
we should have a production system with 80 percent of what most 
people consider lean.  Instead of it happening in two years, it looks 
like it will take six years.  That’s still not bad for a company as big as 
ours. 
 
*Based on an interview with Don Blake, Executive Program Manager, Just –
in-Time/Lean Manufacturing, Wichita Division. 
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 Figure 3 
The Activity Based Costing Initiative* 
 
The Boeing Wichita Activity Based Costing and Management 
(ABCM) effort started as a movement championed by middle 
management.  This is very important since these are the employees 
that are in charge of streamlining factory operations based on financial 
accounting data.  Thus, the thrust to explore ABCM applications was 
born internally to the plan, and was not brought about by external 
market factors.   
 
The goal of the implementation revolved around cost, 
i.e., to “offer a strategic view of how to reduce costs by 
focusing on operations, and helping to develop a 
manufacturing strategy based on financial data.” 
 
Presently there have been a number of different ABCM 
implementations in different manufacturing processes.  The ABCM 
implementation team at BCAG developed a framework that will serve 
as a baseline for all future implementations.  The team uses ABCM as 
a support tool for BCAG’s lean initiatives, while at the same time 
linking the typical manufacturing floor performance metrics to 
financial performance metrics such as cost and returns on assets.  
ABCM enables BCAG to address different issues related to cost such 
as cost of quality, make versus buy decisions, and optimal asset 
management.  It enhances the lean manufacturing effort by accurately 
identifying the true ownership cost of a product or process.  Although 
the ABCM effort is only 2 years old, BCAG is striving towards 
making ABCM and activity analysis the focal point of all cost 
management.  In turn, the BCAG ABCM implementation team hopes 
to export ABCM techniques to all other operations in the facility, and 
migrate the facility’s cost accounting system from its present status to 
a so-called Stage IV, where all standard financial reporting originates 
from activity analysis data collected from the facility’s operations.   
 
To date, the implementation process has been slow, mostly due to lack 
of upper management support.  To counter this problem, the ABCM 
implementation team has found that continuously communicating the 
potential benefits that can be gained from implementing ABCM is 
critical to building support from upper management, while avoiding 
the perception from below that ABCM is “just another lean initiative 
of the week.”   
 
*Based on Rocco Paduano, “Employing Activity Based Costing and 
Management Practices Within the Aerospace Industry:  Sustaining the Drive 
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 for Lean.”  MIT Lean Aerospace Initiative, LARA Case Study working 
paper, January, 2001.   
 
 
Teaching Notes 
 
 
It is people who are at the heart of new work systems – establishing 
stability and then driving continuous improvement.  The Labor 
Aerospace Research Agenda (LARA) at MIT is committed to furthering 
our understanding of the human and institutional aspects of these new 
work systems, especially as they relate to broader issues of 
employment and vitality in the aerospace industry.   
 
These case studies were written by a MIT-based research team and 
were developed in conjunction with representatives from each of the 
sites with the help of representatives of the United Auto Workers and 
the International Association of Machinists. 
 
These case studies will be valuable to union leaders, labor educators, 
college professors and human resource trainers as well as anyone 
interested in discussing current dilemmas in the aerospace industry 
around employment.  These can be used in a classroom setting, in 
small discussion groups, or by individuals as thought starters.  This 
case study was prepared as an example of the challenges of instability 
in the aerospace industry.  It was written as a basis for dialogue and 
learning, not as an illustration of either effective or ineffective actions.  
There may be many possible answers to these questions.  They are 
designed to foster constructive dialogue and action on these very 
challenging issues. 
 
 
Potential Discussion Questions 
 
• What do you see as complementary aspects of HPWO and 
Lean?  
  
• What do you see as the potential points of tension? 
 
• What do you see as complementary aspects of HPWO and 
Activity Based Cost Accounting (ABC)?  What do you see as 
the potential points of tension? 
 
• What do you see as complementary aspects of Activity Based 
Cost Accounting (ABC) and Lean?  What do you see as the 
potential points of tension? 
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• What are options to ensure funding to support front-line 
continuous improvement efforts?  What has worked in your 
organization?  What might help accelerate these efforts in your 
organization? 
 
• How can we best insulate improvement initiatives from internal 
politics within labor or management?  Or, is it okay for these 
initiatives to be impacted by internal politics? 
 
• What are the opportunities associates with giving joint training 
activities a higher profile?  What would be the impact on 
HPWO, Lean and ABC initiatives? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomas A. Kochan prepared this case with editorial and design input 
from the entire LARA team.  This case study is an example of the 
challenges of instability in the aerospace industry and was written as a 
basis for dialogue and learning – not as an illustration of either 
effective or ineffective actions. 
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